FINALRICHARDS.DOC

2/11/2020 11:53 AM

How Not to End Disability

JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

THE ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................... 693
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW: DISABILITY AS INDIVIDUAL MISFORTUNE ................... 695
THE RADICAL VIEW: DISABILITY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION ............................. 697
LESSER WORTH ................................................................................................. 699
DISENTANGLING EQUAL WORTH ........................................................................ 701
INSTRUMENTAL VALUE AS THE CENTRAL ISSUE ................................................. 704
THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION .............................................................. 706
A. Disabling the Able ................................................................................... 708
B. Abling the Disabled ................................................................................. 709
ATTITUDES ........................................................................................................ 711
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 712

VIII.
IX.

I. THE ARGUMENTS
When advances in genetic technology offer the chance of preventing
or curing disease and disability, it is one thing to recommend caution on
the grounds that these obvious benefits may be outweighed by associated
harms. It is quite another to deny even that there are benefits to be
outweighed, and that attempts to prevent disability by these means
should be resisted outright. That, however, is a view that is increasingly
widespread in the disability rights movement.
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The underlying idea is that to try to cope with the social exclusion of
disabled people by preventing them from coming into existence, or by
changing them once they do exist, carries the implication that the
disabled are of less worth than the nondisabled. In fact, however,
according to this view of things, it is discriminatory social arrangements
that do the disabling, and we should try to eliminate disability not by
preventing the existence of the people themselves, or by making them
different, but by recognizing disability as a social construction, and
changing social arrangements and attitudes until it no longer exists.
Ideas of this kind are unevenly sustained and vary in detail, but extreme
exponents of the social construction theory claim to “celebrate” their
natural condition and to object when disabled people (particularly highprofile figures such as Christopher Reeve) publicly long for a medical
breakthrough.
The authors of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice1 regard
this line of argument as serious and important, but think it can
nevertheless be rebutted. First, they argue that trying to prevent the birth
of disabled people in no way implies that once they do exist they are less
worthy of respect than other people.2 Of course the disabled are entitled
to the same consideration, dignity, and rights as everyone else. Second,
they argue directly against the “change society, not people” approach by
saying that even though some disabled people may have legitimate
interests in taking this society-changing course, those are outweighed by
the interests of others whose disabilities might be ended by technical
means, and by the legitimate interests of the nondisabled in not making
the changes that would be necessary.3
It is not entirely clear how these two lines of argument are meant to fit
together. The rationale for the “change society, not people” approach is
that attempts to change the people would imply that they were of less
value than the nondisabled, but if this claim has already been refuted, as
the authors take it to have been,4 that seems to dispose of the main
premise of the argument for doing things this way round. Perhaps the
existence of the second argument suggests uncertainty that the equal
worth issue really has been adequately disposed of.
That, at any rate, is part of my contention here. I shall argue the
authors are right in their overall conclusion that the radical disability
movement cannot justify its opposition to the use of genetic means to
lessen disability, but that their arguments do not reach the roots of the
1.
(2000).
2.
3.
4.
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matter. On the one hand they dispose too quickly of the accusation that
they regard the disabled as of unequal value; on the other they accept too
much of the society-as-disabling thesis. Recognizing this is crucial for
questions not only about the use of genetic technologies, but about all
other issues of disability and discrimination.
This argument also points towards the importance of a more general
topic of enquiry for the subject of genes and social justice: that of
identifying what improvements in life are beyond the reach of any
possible social manipulation, and will need genetic or pharmacological
change if they are to be achieved at all.
II. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW: DISABILITY AS INDIVIDUAL
MISFORTUNE
There used to be in Britain two long-running radio programs about
disability, one called “Does He Take Sugar?” and the other, “No
Triumph, No Tragedy.”5 These titles are not bad exemplars of two
opposed approaches to problems of disability and justice, which may
usefully be called the traditional, or common sense view on the one
hand, and the radical, or social construction view on the other.
The common sense view of disability is the one according to which
disability is a characteristic of the disabled person, and a straightforward
misfortune. And, as with other misfortunes, moral questions arise about
how much effort society as a whole ought to put into trying to prevent or
alleviate them and what forms that effort should take.
The moral question of how much in the way of resources should go
toward improving the situation of the disabled, either from individuals or
from public organizations, is as difficult and disputed as all other
questions about social justice, and it is to be expected that different
moral and political principles will support quite different conclusions.
The traditional approach to disability allows for both conservative and
radical opinions about the just distribution of resources and organization
of society.
The question of what form the attempts at remedy should take seems,
in contrast, to have fairly clear answers. The first aim should be to
5. Does He Take Sugar? (British Broadcasting Corporation 1977–1987)
(discussing various disability issues in order to educate the nondisabled public); No
Triumph, No Tragedy (British Broadcasting Corporation 1999–2000) (interviewing wellknown disabled achievers).
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eliminate the problem at its roots by trying to eliminate disability, either
by preventing the existence of disabled people in the first place, or by
using our increasing skills to cure their disabilities. To the extent that
we cannot do that, we should supply devices (including human and
animal helpers) that provide substitutes for the missing ability. And
finally, for the disabled whom we cannot enable properly by any of these
means, we should minimize the impact of disability as far as practicable
by adapting the environment, by making a range of special concessions,
and by improving interactions between able and disabled people—so
that we know exactly how to ask the man in a wheelchair, rather than
some helper, whether he takes sugar. The varieties of remedy clearly
come in that order, because if the disability is a misfortune of disabled
people, the best situation is for it not to exist at all, the next is for it to be
removed, and the least good is for it to be merely alleviated. This is why
most people regard the prospect of preventing disability as an enormous
good.
This common sense approach is in line with what we already do to
improve the situation of the disabled, even though it may reasonably be
said that far more is needed. We do modify the environment, and we
make special legal provisions for disabled people. This is what much
so-called antidiscrimination legislation amounts to. But we do a good
deal more in the way of providing gadgets and helpers—human or
animal—to lessen the impact of disability on individuals. And
increasingly, as far as possible, we use genetic counseling,
preimplantation screening of embryos, and fetal monitoring to anticipate
and prevent disability, and whatever technical means are available to
remove the disabilities of people who already exist.
It is worth commenting that even within this traditional way of
looking at things, according to which the prevention or cure of disability
is unequivocally good in itself, it is not necessarily good all-thingsconsidered. The good might be outweighed by unwelcome side effects.
For instance, if parents can easily avoid having disabled children, those
who choose not to do so—perhaps for religious reasons—may be
increasingly exposed to criticism, and disabled people themselves may
be made to feel, even more than at present, that other people would
rather they had not been born. While (as the authors argue) it is
implausible that if there were smaller numbers of disabled people that
would result in a lessening of support for them,6 there are many ways in
which smaller numbers would be a disadvantage. The fewer people there are
with a particular kind of disability (such as deafness), the more difficult
it will be for them to form self-contained communities in which their
6.

696

See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 266–67.

FINALRICHARDS.DOC

[VOL. 39: 693, 2002]

2/11/2020 11:53 AM

How Not to End Disability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

disability does not lead to social exclusion. Smaller numbers also means
that the able will have less experience of interacting with the disabled
and may be less well equipped to avoid the “does he take sugar?”
mistakes.
So there are some real questions about whether all intrinsically good
applications of genetic technology should actually be used. Nevertheless,
according to the traditional view of disability, there is no doubt about
their intrinsic value, and therefore a strong presumption in their favor.
III. THE RADICAL VIEW: DISABILITY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
According to this traditional way of thinking, the disabled are people
who have an inherent disadvantage that should ideally be prevented or
removed. But the radical view is quite different. According to this way
of thinking, the disabled are disadvantaged not by nature but by society,
in the way that women and different racial groups have traditionally
been disadvantaged. Their apparent inferiority comes from their social
position and treatment. “Woman feels inferior,” Simone de Beauvoir
claimed, “because, in fact, the requirements of femininity do belittle
her”7; and George Bernard Shaw commented famously on “the haughty
American nation [which] makes the negro clean its boots and then
proves the moral and physical inferiority of the negro by the fact that
he’s a shoeblack.”8 In both cases the disadvantages are real but have
nothing directly to do with sex or color, and for women or blacks to
accept otherwise would be to collaborate in their oppression. They
should want not to change their race or sex, but rather to overthrow the
social organization that demeans them.
The claim of the radical disability movement is that disability should
be understood in the same way. On this view, disability—which is
indeed a disadvantage—should be seen not as inherent to the members
of the group but rather as a function of their interaction with an
uncongenial environment. So-called disabled people are not disabled by
nature, but merely “impaired,” and how much that impairment disables
them depends on their environment. To try to improve the situation of
the disabled by preventing the birth of impaired children, or by “curing”
7. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 408–09 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1952) (1949).
8. G. BERNARD SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN: A COMEDY AND A PHILOSOPHY xviii
(1903).
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any that were born, would be like trying to remedy the problems of
women and racial minorities by testosterone injections and skin bleaching.
Disabled people should not fall into the trap set by an oppressive society,
and act as though the problems were their own. They must insist that the
change should come in society, not in themselves.
This view of the nature of disability leads to political conclusions
quite opposed to those of the traditional common sense view, in two
ways. First, it completely inverts the preferred order of attempts to
prevent disability. The very last thing you should do is to try to prevent
impaired people from existing at all. You should also not try to prevent
or cure their impairment, because that would be to imply that they were
naturally of lesser worth. Impaired people should be valued just as they
are, and society should be changed to remove the disability that devalues
them.
The approach also represents a quite different account of the force of
the claim for remedy, as is implied in the rhetoric of the “construction”
of disability. This term implies both that disability need not have existed
and that, because it is an illegitimate construction, the people who did
the constructing have a duty to dismantle it. The existence of disability,
as opposed to impairment, is a straightforward injustice like race and sex
discrimination, and should therefore be abolished. This way of viewing
the matter makes the disability rights issue far more straightforward than
it is for people who hold the traditional view, which allows unlimited
scope for disagreement—and indeed serious moral puzzlement—about
how many resources should be put into improving the situation of the
disabled. The moral clarity of the radical case is obviously one of its
advantages from the point of view of campaigners, in providing a
justification for blame, anger, and demands.
It is important to stress that the contrast drawn here between two
approaches to disability is intended as a tool of clarification, not as a
description of two groups of people. Most people would probably find,
if they considered their views in detail, that they were a mixture of the
two. In particular, very few individuals would find that they held a
consistent version of the radical view, but the rhetoric is nevertheless
widespread—to the extent of having become required for political
correctness in many places.
But the two approaches are not compatible, and any confusion is
serious because they have such different implications. Anyone concerned
about policy needs to sort out the basics before moving on to the details,
and must decide which of these diametrically opposed approaches to the
question is the right one to take.
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IV. LESSER WORTH
As already suggested, the basis of the radical, social construction
objection to the traditional approach is that attempts to remedy the
problems of disability by preventing the existence of disabled people
depends on their being regarded as less valuable than the nondisabled.
The same applies to attempts to remove their disabilities, because this
implies that the disabled are inadequate as they are.
The authors, who have a good deal of sympathy for the radicals in
spite of coming down against them, reply directly to this point.9 They
certainly do not think of themselves as regarding disabled people as any
less valuable than others. They insist that existing disabled people must
be recognized as having exactly the same human dignity and rights as
everybody else, and that nothing less should be implied by their
position.10
For instance, it is no part of their case to claim that a disabled life is
not worth living.11 This is an argument commonly used by people who
think that children of certain kinds should never come into existence:
when a deaf couple recently set out to have a child who was deaf (by
finding a sperm donor with the requisite genetic make up), there was a
public outcry about how terrible it was to deprive a child of such an
important ability. But that particular child was not deprived of anything,
because if the parents had not chosen to select a congenitally deaf child,
that child would never have existed at all. The authors agree that the
worthwhileness of a disabled life is obviously a matter to be decided by
whoever is living it, and because nearly all disabled people say
emphatically that they are glad to have lived, preventing the existence of
a disabled child cannot—except in the limiting case of one whose life is
likely to be worse than nothing—be for the sake of the child. If the
parents of the deliberately deaf child acted wrongly, it was not because
they wronged the child.
The authors also claim that their view does not imply that the disabled
have no right to life.12 Of course, they insist, disabled lives should have
just the same protection as nondisabled lives; but this is compatible with
genetic counseling that may lead to the avoidance of conception,
9.
10.
11.
12.

BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 274–81.
Id. at 274–76.
See id. at 274–81.
Id. at 274.
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because in those instances there are as yet no people to have rights.13
And it is compatible even with embryo screening and selective abortion,
because normal embryos and fetuses do not have the (legal) right to life
either, and only people who think that abortion is morally acceptable in
itself think that abortion on grounds of disability is morally acceptable.
Disabled and nondisabled rights remain the same throughout.14
On what basis then can the authors defend measures designed to
ensure the birth of able rather than disabled children? Their claim is in
effect that although most disabled lives are worth living, disability is a
serious disadvantage, and—other things being equal—it is better to bring
into existence a life without such a known disadvantage than with one.15
Of course, it is not necessarily true that any particular nondisabled
person will be happier and more useful than a particular disabled person.
But if you have the choice between two possible people to bring into the
world, of whom you know nothing but that one has a major disadvantage
which the other lacks, it is perfectly rational—not to say morally
necessary—to choose the one without the disadvantage. And this has
nothing to do with infringing anyone’s rights, since there is as yet
nobody in existence to have their rights infringed.
So policies of preventing disabled children from coming into
existence, according to the authors, involve no suggestion that disabled
people are of lesser dignity, or less entitled to full human rights, than the
able.16 It is simply better to bring into existence people without, than
with, known disadvantages.17
But is this really an adequate reply to the accusations made by radical
disability campaigners? It seems to me that it is not, for two reasons.
First, although the authors do not make the mistake of saying that a
disabled life is not worth living, they do say that it is better to bring a
nondisabled than a disabled life into the world.18 In other words, they
are saying that a disabled life is worth less to its possessor than a
nondisabled life would be. The radical campaigners do agree, of course,
that a disabled life is worse (other things equal) than a nondisabled one,
which is why they are campaigning to remove disability by changing
society. But because the point at issue between the two sides is whether
disability is a natural or a socially-constructed state, the authors claim
that it is objectively better for nondisabled rather than disabled children
to be conceived or born is straightforwardly question begging. It
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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presupposes that disability is something one is born with.
Second, even though the authors claim that you can justify trying to
have nondisabled children because nondisabled lives are more worth
living, they insist that disabled people are completely equal in value to
other people.19 But do they, and others who say the same thing, really
believe it? Consider, as an extreme case that presents the matter starkly,
the situation of would-be parents who decide that if their children would
be disabled, they would rather have none at all. A woman at the end of
her childbearing years might decide to abort a Down syndrome fetus
even though she was unlikely to conceive again, or a couple might be
persuaded by their genetic history that it would be better for them not to
have children. The argument about preferring a life without disadvantages
to one with them does not apply in these cases where there will be no
life at all, so the conclusion must be that having a disabled child is being
regarded as having positive disvalue—as worse than nothing. But if
disabled lives are themselves worth living, as has been conceded, this
disvalue is not to the potential child. This means it must be the potential
parents for whom having a disabled child is regarded as having positive
disvalue; and that in turn means there is some sense in which they regard
disabled people as of less value than others. And the same is true of
everyone who feels sympathy with their decision—as the authors, and
many others, presumably would.
As the radical disability movement well understands, no amount of
protestation about full human rights for disabled people can alter the fact
that there is some sense that most people—probably including the
authors—regard disabled people as having less value than others. If the
root of the problem is to be reached, it is necessary to establish precisely
what that sense is.
V. DISENTANGLING EQUAL WORTH
The meaning of the claim that people are of equal worth or value is
clear enough in a religious context: people are equally valuable in the
sense of being equally valuable to God. Because that view of things
often accompanies the idea that people should welcome whatever
children God sends into the world, a religious view of equal human
worth may lead to conclusions similar to those of the radical disability
movement. However, most of the claims about the equal worth of
19.

Id. at 276–78.
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disabled people have nothing to do with religion, so it is necessary to
examine secular ideas of worth.
A useful starting point is an old essay by Gregory Vlastos.20 It is
particularly useful because he actually used the term, “equal worth,” and
like the authors, thought that equal worth is something that everybody
has. He explains the kind of worth he had in mind by contrasting it with
what he describes as people’s merit as part of the social machinery: in
effect their instrumental worth.21 Instrumentally, the clever usually (not
always—it depends on context) have more worth than the stupid, the fast
than the slow, and the skillful than the clumsy. But that does not imply
that they have unequal worth in the sense Vlastos is concerned with.
People have equal intrinsic worth in the sense that their happiness and
their freedom matter equally. The suffering of a stupid person is,
intrinsically, exactly as important as the same amount of suffering in a
clever person. There may sometimes be instrumental considerations that
allow the interests of some people to be placed before the equal interests
of others; for example, the statesman negotiating a treaty of benefit to
millions may reasonably be helped in preference to an unskilled laborer
in equal need, because of the good he can achieve for others. But this is
not because he is of greater intrinsic importance.22
When intrinsic value, or worth, is spelled out in this way, it is
immediately recognizable as part of a familiar set of loosely related
ideas about the fundamentals of ethics: the Benthamite idea that in a
utilitarian calculation everyone should count for one and nobody for
more than one,23 Nagel’s claim that considered objectively—from
nowhere—everyone’s life matters enormously and equally,24 and Kant’s
view that we all have absolute, unconditional dignity and worth.25 There
are innumerable variations on this theme but they are all about equality
in some kind of objective entitlement to consideration and respect, and it
is clear that in some such sense of equal worth there is no problem at all
in regarding disabled and nondisabled people as equal. Value in this
sense is not about personal preference—it is not dependent on being
valued by anyone—but about something like equal objective mattering,
or equal fundamental rights. This is the kind of thing that the authors
seem to mean when they discuss equal respect, concern, and dignity, and
20. Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in KENNETH E. BOULDING ET AL.,
SOCIAL JUSTICE 31 (Richard B. Brandt ed., 1962)
21. Id. at 45.
22. Id. at 51.
23. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT §1.4–7 (F.C. Montague ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1951) (1776).
24. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 12 (1991).
25. IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
§ 2 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ’g 1949) (1785).
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they are right to claim that this kind of equality of value is entirely
compatible with the traditional view of disability.
However, Vlastos’s clarification of worth in this sense was made by
contrast with a different kind of value: value in the social machinery,
value to other people—not impersonally, but personally.26 This offers a
much more natural understanding of the idea of value. If you value
someone, you are usually taken to be doing something much more than
regarding them as objectively entitled to have their interests taken
equally into account at some point in moral and political thinking. (This
is why the idea that everyone is of equal intrinsic worth is easy to
understand if you can appeal to the idea of equal value to God, but is
more difficult to interpret in a secular way.)
If people value you in this more natural sense rather than just thinking
that you have value in some impersonal way, it means they want you—
rather than other people—because you are better as a means to fulfill their
own ends. They may value you as a friend, a lover, a spouse, a child, a
colleague, an employee, a role model, a source of entertainment, or an ally
in their struggle against globalization. There are endless possibilities. The
ends in question need not be selfish; they can be connected with
commitments to other people or wider projects. But what links them is
the fact that if people value you in this way, your loss would be felt as a
personal loss. If someone you do not know or do not personally care
about dies you may feel some kind of abstract regret, but if someone you
really value dies you suffer because of your own loss. You value such
people in part as means to your own (broadly understood) ends, rather
than just as ends in themselves.
This seems to be what must be going on in the case of people who
would rather have no child at all than a disabled one. Perhaps they think
that a disabled child would take far more time and effort than they are
willing to give. Perhaps they think that the reward will not be worth the
effort because their interest is in a child who will eventually be fully
functioning and independent. Perhaps they think that a disabled child
will be a burden to the rest of the family, or the community, or the state.
Whatever the details, they must regard a child with disabilities as
something that would be bad for them, or for other people and things
they care about. They are seeing a disabled child as being of
instrumental disvalue.
26.

Vlastos, supra note 20, at 48–49.
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It is hard to doubt that most people must regard disability as having
negative value. However strong their all-things-considered commitment
to any or all existing disabled people, however willing they are to do all
they can to make life as good as possible for them, and even though they
would not change their existing disabled child or spouse or colleague for
any able-bodied person in the world, the fact remains that most people
would think it better for themselves if their disabled friends and relations
and employees were not disabled.
This instrumental way of thinking about people’s value—which is the
one we use all the time when we are not trying to grapple with theories
of justice—is the one that is not taken into account by the authors’
protestations of the equal value of everybody, disabled or not. Their
analysis, though of course right as far as it goes, does not recognize what
the disability rights campaigners recognize all too well: that however
much impartial value disabled people may be allowed by the traditional
approach to disability, everyone must regard a disabled person as worth
less in this instrumental way than an otherwise identical nondisabled
person. Even if it does not result in all-things-considered negative value,
disability must usually be a lessener of positive instrumental value.
So, in any discussion of people’s value, it is necessary to distinguish
between their intrinsic and instrumental value: their value as ends in
themselves and their value as means to other people’s ends.
VI. INSTRUMENTAL VALUE AS THE CENTRAL ISSUE
It may be said—it is certainly often implied—that people’s
instrumental value should not matter, and that we should consider only
their intrinsic value. If disabled people are, qua disabled, of lesser
instrumental value for all kinds of purposes, we should be attacking the
whole idea of people’s being valued in this kind of way.
It is, however, a view that is impossible to sustain. Even Kant said
that people should not be treated only as means to ends.27 Whatever
your purposes in life—even if you are a perfect altruist and your whole
concern is to maximize other people’s well-being with no concern for
your own—you will still value instrumentally people who are best at
advancing that purpose and regard as having disvalue people who hinder
it. It is impossible to imagine a world in which we did not care about the
characteristics and abilities of people we worked with or chose as our
friends and lovers.
Furthermore, perhaps more strikingly, nobody would want to be the
friend or employee of someone who had no such concern. We do not
27.
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want people that employ us or spend time in our company to express
their impartial concern for us. We want their personal valuing of us to
be selfish. We want people to feel personal regret if we leave our work,
move away, or die—not just a kind of abstract regret. We want to be
wanted. The idea that people’s instrumental value should not, or even
could not, matter to other people does not survive five minutes’
reflection.
However, this is a slippery subject; and fortunately there is no need for
present purposes to prove the point. The subject at issue here is the
difference between radical and traditional approaches to disability; and
when that difference is considered in the light of the distinction between
intrinsic and instrumental value, it becomes clear that all the special
concerns of the radical approach have to do with instrumental value.
This is shown partly by the fact that the intrinsic kind of worth—equal
moral importance—is fully allowed by the traditional view, as the
authors (in effect) argue.28 However, it is shown directly by the fact that
everything that is distinctive about the radical view—everything that
cannot be expressed in traditional terms, even when those are combined
with strongly egalitarian theories of justice—is about instrumental value.
Both radical and traditional camps accept the fact that a disabled
person is of lesser instrumental value to other people in many contexts,
and also that disability is instrumentally disadvantageous to disabled
people themselves. Both recognize that one of the problems of being
disabled is that it makes you less valuable to other people. Both want to
lessen this disvalue by preventing the disability from existing or
remedying it in some way. The difference comes in their accounts of
what makes someone disabled, and how that disability might be
removed. Traditionalists think that the disability is an aspect of the
disabled person, and try to prevent, cure, or find means to alleviate it.
Radicals regard disability as a social construct that exists not in the
individual but in the interaction with society. On the radical account,
impairment as such does not make people of lesser instrumental value,
either to other people or to themselves. It is the social circumstances in
which impaired people find themselves that create the disability, which
is why disability should be regarded not as a natural misfortune but as a
ground for grievance.
Concern with instrumental value is also implied by much of the
28.

See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 266–81.
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politically correct terminology insisted on by radicals, such as
“wheelchair user” and “sign language user.” Why is “wheelchair user”
preferable to “wheelchair bound” (which enrages some disability
activists)? The point of “wheelchair bound” is to emphasize that the
person cannot move without a wheelchair. “Wheelchair user” is
presumably meant to make it sound as though it is a mere difference—
something the person chooses to do—rather than a limitation. That
implies that it is regarded as objectionable to see a limitation in the
person. The point shows even more in the ultra-correct term “differently
abled.” The purpose is to insist that people with impairments are merely
different in what they can do, rather than lesser. The insistence is on
being regarded as of equal instrumental value not on equal impersonal
mattering.
This is why the radical disability movement is, and indeed, by its own
standards should be, unmoved by the insistence of the authors that their
policies do not imply any inequality of worth between disabled and
nondisabled people. Those arguments are about impartial value, or
mattering; the radical disability concerns are about instrumental value.
You cannot solve the problem by what amounts to an ignoratio elenchi:
answering the radical arguments by proving that the traditional approach
allows equal intrinsic value to disabled people, when the special concern
of the radical social construction approach is instrumental value. You
might just as well try to console your rejected lover by saying that of
course you love him; you love everybody.
The radical disability movement has a genuine concern, not obviously
met by the traditional approach, and which seems to me entirely
understandable. A social animal could not fail to be concerned about its
value to other members of its species. Whether this can justify the
movement’s resistance to traditional policies that involve trying to
change people, and its insistence on changing society instead, seems to
depend on an assessment of how much could possibly be achieved by
these means. That is the next question.
VII. THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
To some extent the authors seem to go along with the idea of disability
as socially constructed.29 They waver between two positions: the
obviously reasonable one of saying that you can improve things for the
disabled by modifying the environment, and the strong one that
environments—what they call cooperative frameworks—can remove or

29.
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make disabilities.30 The radical approach requires the second of these.
The authors have no need to clarify the matter, however, because their
objection to going down the society-changing road is that of unfairness
to the able, who themselves have legitimate interests, and to the disabled
who would rather take the person-changing route. They argue that
changing society to make a full integration of everyone would involve a
kind of leveling down—like making everyone play games that children
could join in31—that might be good for the people who were thereby
included, but would be bad for the people who could play more difficult
games. (I am reminded of an aesthetics seminar in which a blind woman
protested every time the rest of group made any reference to paintings.)
In making this objection, however, the authors seem to be conflating
two issues. One is the familiar one of whether equality matters so much
that it is legitimately achieved by leveling down, or whether the only
acceptable method is to try to level up—even if greater inequality remains.
The other is whether we should try to achieve the relevant kind of equality
by changing the people or changing the society. The authors argue against
the social change method by claiming that leveling down—making the
society such that everyone can join in—is unjust to other people.
However, the leveling down objection applies just as much to the peoplechanging and the society-changing methods. It cannot work as an
argument against the society-changing method, in particular, without
separate evidence about what could be achieved by leveling up and
leveling down in both people-changing and society-changing approaches.
Before the question arises of which direction you should do your
leveling in, there is the prior question of how much you could possibly
achieve by either method; and there is an interesting difference of
implied expectations between the two. The technological, peopleimproving approach does not depend on any assumption that disability
could ever be eliminated by those means; it requires only the belief that
the less disability there is, the better things are. The social construction
theory, on the other hand, does seem to imply that disability need not
have been constructed and could be eliminated by social change. That is
what needs investigation.

30.
31.

Id. at 288–98.
Id. at 293.
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A. Disabling the Able
The idea that society determines who will be disabled implies claims
in two directions: that we could, by changing our social arrangements
and values, disable the currently able, and that people who are naturally
impaired would not be disabled if we made the appropriate changes.
The idea that circumstances can disable the able is one that comes in
H.G. Wells’s well-known story, The Country of the Blind,32 in which a
sighted man, mindful of the saying that in the country of the blind the
one-eyed man is king, comes across an isolated community of blind
people and expects to become the most powerful member of the
community. But he is not used to their arrangements, and blunders
around with such incompetence that he is reduced to serfdom. The
others want to remove his eyes, which they take to be the cause of his
delusions. He escapes back to the world in which his sight is an
advantage, not a drawback.
This kind of theme is pursued by some radical disability campaigners.
One, for instance—one of the disabled who claims to celebrate his
condition—imagines a Wells-type situation in which able-bodied people
found themselves in an environment designed by a community of
wheelchair users, with low doorways and ceilings.33 They kept banging
their heads on lintels and suffering back problems through being bent
double all the time. Eventually,
. . . the wheelchair-user doctors, wheelchair-user psychiatrists, wheelchairuser social workers etc. were involved in the problems of the able-bodied
villagers. . . . They saw how the bruises and painful backs . . . were caused by
their physical condition. . . . They said these able-bodied people suffered a
“loss or reduction of functional ability” which resulted in a handicap. This
handicap caused a “disadvantage or restriction of activity,” which made them
disabled in this society.34

They were given special aids such as helmets and braces, and “some
doctors even went so far as to suggest that there was no hope for these
poor sufferers unless they too used wheelchairs.”35
But in fact, as this last sentence shows, the thought experiment proves
just the opposite of what is intended. The able people of course have
problems in their new environment, but they are capable of doing
everything the natives can, and there is nothing to stop them from
learning to use wheelchairs. They are not yet experienced in the new
32. H.G. WELLS, The Country of the Blind, in THE FAMOUS SHORT STORIES OF H.G.
WELLS 163, 163–88 (Doubleday, Doran & Company 1937) (1895).
33. Vic Finkelstein, To Deny or Not to Deny Disability, in HANDICAP IN A SOCIAL
WORLD: A READER 34, 34–35 (Ann Brechin et al. eds., 1981).
34. Id.
35. Id.

708

FINALRICHARDS.DOC

[VOL. 39: 693, 2002]

2/11/2020 11:53 AM

How Not to End Disability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

ways of doing things and will be permanently inconvenienced by not
being able to use their extra abilities, but they are not disabled. Wells’s
hero could have learned his way around his new society and refrained
from talking about the things that made others think he was mad. Nearly
all of us could learn to use a wheelchair. But the blind cannot learn to
read printed books, nor paraplegics to walk up stairs.
The simple fact is that you cannot turn an ability into a disability,
whatever you do with the environment. Particular abilities may be
drawbacks in some circumstances, and might even lead to social
exclusion. (We probably would not want to spend much time in the
company of an accurate reader of minds, if there were such a thing.)
And, of course, different abilities have value in different environments.
But they can never be disabilities.
A less extreme version of this is idea is that any lack of ability is a
potential disability, and that whether it becomes one or not depends on
the environment. Currently unimportant absences of ability might, with
a change of environment, become disabilities. Perhaps there are some
impairments—not currently seen as disabilities but potentially such—
though we shall not know what they are until changed environments
make them appear. However, it seems unlikely that there could be many
of them because it is certainly not true that any impairment could
become a disability in some context. It would not be a disability unless
most people had the corresponding ability and it was crucial to normal
functioning. The first of these alone makes it almost certain that most
people could not be disabled by any possible social change. They could
be inconvenienced or disadvantaged relative to their previous position,
but not disabled.
B. Abling the Disabled
The main question, however, is about the possibility of changing the
environment so that the currently disabled—the people with
impairments—would be, as they say, “enabled.”
This calls for clarification of what counts as environmental change. If
you cannot prevent or remove an impairment, the most obvious way to
get disabled people properly functioning in ordinary society is to find a
technological substitute for the missing ability: aural implants,
spectacles, wheelchairs, speech synthesizers, and so on. All of these are
designed to make the disabled more like other people by remedying the
impairment. Next comes the provision of help with various animal and
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human assistants: guide dogs, signers, wheelchair pushers, and so on.
These are things that, as it were, follow the disabled person around.
Finally, there are aids scattered around the environment, such as ramps
and beepers on crossings and notices with Braille translations.
In that list there is a difference between things that work as
modifications or extensions of the person (things you take around with
you) and modifications to the environment (things which stay there all
the time in case you encounter them). At the moment we go much more
for the first, and regard the others as supplements or inferior substitutes.
But if you take the radical idea seriously, you should not be going for the
ones that improve the abilities of individuals because these are all aimed
at making the disabled more like other, nondisabled, people. If you are
going to take this approach, you would obviously do better to remove
the impairment altogether—which gets you back to the common sense
approach to disability. A serious social constructionist should think
disability could be eliminated without any need for either the rectifying
tools people take around with them, or the dedicated help of other people
and animals.
However, when this is clarified, the idea of removing disability by
redesigning the environment is manifestly a nonstarter. If this is not
obvious, think of any disability (such as blindness or paraplegia) and
then imagine the world as full as you like of ramps, Braille, beepers,
moving walkways, and other contraptions. There may be a few contexts
where a particular disability does effectively disappear, as long as you
consider very limited environments. But it is hard to think of many even
then; and as soon as you went beyond a specially designed locality, the
disability would become significant again because abilities are openended in their application. No matter how conveniently a paraplegic
might move around in a town there would be problems about trying to
keep up with a party climbing in the Himalayas—and it would be
difficult to attribute this to any kind of social construction. And if such
problems appear in thought experiments about only one particular
disability, they appear far more when you consider the endless types and
degrees of disability that exist, and imagine trying to construct
environments that could cope with them all.
Filling the social space with enabling devices would be the leveling up
option. So if that is hopeless, perhaps more could be done by the version
of the arrangement the authors object to: leveling the environment down
so that the able were not at an advantage. If everyone lived in the dark,
the sighted could not exchange glances that the blind were unable to see.
But even if the moral objection to leveling down seems inconclusive, the
thought experiment once more fizzles out as soon as you think about the
details. If you wanted to eliminate the disadvantages of blindness, you
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would have to darken the whole world. And if you start to consider
more than one disability, the thought experiment degenerates into chaos.
We would have to suppress sounds, or the deaf would be left out; the
deaf would not be able to use sign language because that would leave the
blind out; everyone would have to go around in wheelchairs. Or
perhaps, because there are some who cannot even do that without
assistance, everyone might just have to stay in bed. The mind boggles.
The authors’ reply to the “change the society” line is that it would be
too hard on the nondisabled, but the danger is not one that can arise.36
They concede too much in saying that social arrangements determine
who shall be disabled. Social arrangements can make some differences,
but they can no more turn disabilities into abilities than vice versa.
VIII. ATTITUDES
That was about the physical environment, but problems about moving
around and seeing are of course not the only aspect of integration. The
essence of the disability issue is rightly seen by the authors as the matter
of social inclusion. This is why it is often said that we need to change
values and attitudes, and remove disability that way.
Often what people have in mind are perfectly reasonable (traditional,
common sense) measures to make the disabled better integrated—in
particular, familiarizing the able population with disabled people so that
they learn how to interact with them. This is undoubtedly one of the
most important elements of all. One of the greatest problems of
integration of the disabled is that there are hardly any clearly established
conventions, and when we do not know what the rules are in some
situation, we often try to avoid it altogether.
However, it is often said that we should change values rather than just
manners: that we should “value diversity” or “celebrate difference,” and
think of impaired people as differently abled. Such claims carry the
implication that if we did not have such narrow values, we should value
disabled people just as they are. Once again, however, there is the
question not only of what should be valued but of what could be.
The idea of an increasing diversity of values is in itself
understandable. If I am hooked on Georgian architecture and unable to
see beauty in Sixties brutalism, you may try to persuade me to appreciate
both. I may think your project ridiculous, but there is no difficulty about
36.

See discussion supra Part VII.B.
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my understanding what you want me to do.
But this kind of idea runs into serious problems with disability.
Lacking an ability is not a way of having another ability. I do not have
an ability, lacked by Glenn Gould, to bungle Bach; I simply lack his
ability to play Bach properly, and no amount of diversification of values
can make my inability valuable.
You may say that people who lack some abilities have others instead,
that I can do many things that Glenn Gould could not. I trust that is true;
but there is no necessary connection. Some people are high on the scale
of many abilities; many are high on none. Some disabled people of
course have abilities that most able people have not, and their not being
able to do some things will leave them freer to concentrate on others.
Perhaps Art Tatum might not have been such an outstanding pianist if he
had not been nearly blind. But it is possible to lack an ability without
having anything else to compensate. Disability can affect people of any
ability, and although some disabled people have, all things considered,
far more abilities than many nondisabled people, some of them will have
naturally very few. If you suddenly become disabled, you quite simply
have fewer abilities than you had before.
You can value people for a lack of ability. You may value eunuchs in
your harem, or you may value colleagues with lesser abilities than yours
because you look better by comparison. (It is said that first class
academics want to make first class appointments and second class
academics want to make third class appointments.) But that is not the
kind of valuing the radical disability movement has in mind. Your
disability might be valued because your jealous spouse wanted someone
immobile to keep an eye on you but you would not like your disability
“celebrated” for that reason.
The fact is, trying to cope with disability by turning it into different
abilities can be done—to the extent that it is even theoretically
possible—only by doing exactly what the radical disability movement
does not want: playing a huge, patronizing charade of pretending that a
disability everyone knows is intrinsic to the person is just a matter of
society. How disabling any disability is in practice does indeed depend on
context, but disability is still an attribute of the disabled person.
IX. CONCLUSION
It may be said that these arguments constitute another ignoratio
elenchi—this time by exaggeration—because nobody in the radical
disability movement is advocating the ridiculous social changes I have
been discussing here. However, as I said earlier, the point was not to
describe people’s actual thoughts and arguments, but to test the social
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construction theory of disability. If disability were socially constructed, it
should be possible to imagine changes in social arrangements that would
get rid of it—or at least move it to a different group of people. We cannot
do this. Disability remains a species-relative natural phenomenon.
It is important to press the radical theory to its limits, because if it is
expressed only at a superficial level it may sound plausible, and that may
have serious effects on policy. It has already permeated a good deal of
political thought and language, and the harm that can be done is
illustrated by the case of the deaf parents who deliberately produced a
deaf child. They claimed this as a positive act—giving the child access
to a special culture—but it was no such thing. A hearing child could
easily have access to deaf culture; anyone who can see can learn sign
language. All that is achieved by making a child deaf is preventing its
access to mainstream culture, confining it to deaf culture. This has
advantages for the deaf parents, no doubt, but it is a straightforward
disadvantage for the child. If this kind of corkscrew thinking were
allowed to prevail, to the extent of putting a halt to our attempts to
minimize disability by technical means, it would be a tragedy.
The radical view that disability is a social construction is underpinned
by seriously important concerns, but it is in itself an intellectual and
moral disaster. It is bad for everyone, including disabled people
themselves—and especially for the enormous numbers of them to whom
the “differently abled” label must seem as absurd and patronizing as it
does, really, to many of the able people who try to take it seriously.
Because being patronized is regarded by many disabled people as one
of the most serious afflictions they face, that is yet another reason for
abandoning the social construction view, and for embracing the
technology which may help to prevent or alleviate disability.
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